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GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
David Bogen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment analysis of generally applicable laws
is a new battleground for the Supreme Court. The Justices agree
that the First Amendment protects expression and religious exercise from impairment by laws that are not generally applicable.
The Court will carefully scrutinize laws that apply only to activities involving speech, press or the exercise of religion, e.g.,
parade permits, loudspeaker volume regulations, broadcast regulation, and political leaflet regulation. 1 Similarly, the Court will
invoke First Amendment standards when a law applies to behavior that is engaged in exclusively for reiigious or expressive purposes, such as prohibiting the slaughter of animals for religious
reasons. 2 The standards for a generally applicable law are in
* B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Harvard University, LL.M. 1967 N.Y.U. Law School.
Professor of Law University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank my
research assistant, Susan Winchurch, University of Maryland School of Law '96. I would
also like to thank my Maryland colleague Greg Young, and my colleagues during a visit
at California Western, Michael Belknap and Marilyn Ireland, for their helpful comments. My thanks does not suggest that they concur in any portion of my analysis.
1. See Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (anonymous
political leaflets); Thrn,er Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) [hereinafter Turner] ("must carry" rules for cable); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)
(loudspeakers); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (parade permit).
2. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) [hereinafter Lukumi].
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conflict, however, revealing an inconsistency that marks a process of change.
This article focuses on the generally applicable law that is
also content-neutrat,J i.e. where the regulated behavior is usually engaged in for reasons other than expression or religious exercise, and the religious or expressive content of the behavior is
irrelevant to the application of the law. For instance, a law
prohibiting the sale or use of alcohol deals with behavior that
usually is engaged in to achieve pleasurable sensations.
Although alcohol use may be important in some religious ceremonies, any impact on religion or expression from a general prohibition on alcohol use is probably incidental. The issue is
whether that impact should trigger an analysis under First
Amendment standards.
From one perspective, the concept of equality before the
law is violated by exemptions from generally applicable laws,
and the Constitution should not be interpreted to require such
inequality. Thus, neither religious belief nor communicative intent should provide its holder with a privilege to engage in conduct that would be illegal if it was engaged in by another. 4 An
3. Although the content of a law may be influenced by the enacting body's religious values, the law is "content-neutral" in the sense used here when the religious or
communicative aspects of the regulated behavior are irrelevant. The content-based law
turns on the content of the communication. Content-based laws are subject to "strict
scrutiny." See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477. "Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that
the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather
than persuasion." /d. at 2458. The specific test applied, however, is very sensitive to
context- e.g., whether the speech is injurious to reputation, arouses sexual thoughts,
insults the listener, sells a product, etc.
Content-neutral laws that regulate expressive behavior are subject to intermediate
scrutiny "because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas
or viewpoints from the public dialogue." /d. at 2459. That risk is even less from a
content-neutral law that is also generally applicable.
4. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). "Can a man excuse
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to
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opposite perspective would stress the disparate impact resulting
from the application of some laws to persons who act for religious or communicative reasons. Proponents of this latter perspective would argue that the constitutional concern for free
exercise of religion and freedom of speech justifies some degree
of protection from generally applicable laws. 5
Where the free exercise of religion is at issu~, a majority of
the Justices in recent decisions have indicated that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment. 6 In
1993, Congress passed "The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act" 7 to restore the compelling interest test espoused by the minority in these cases. 8 The statute does not direct the Court to
change its interpretation of the First Amendment, but establishes a new statutory right. Future litigants claiming a burden
on the free exercise of their religion are likely to rely on the
statute, and thus the Court may have few occasions to reconsider
its interpretation of the free exercise clause. The Court's position on generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise
Clause, however, ultimately may affect its resolution of the issue
with respect to freedom of speech.
The Court has sent mixed signals about the application of
the guarantee of free speech to generally applicable laws. Sometimes it applies the test from United States v. O'Brien, 9 which
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." /d.
5. This latter perspective reflects Anatole France's sarcasm concerning "the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges,
to beg in the streets or to steal their bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE REo LILY 75
(Modern Library trans., 1st ed. 1894) ..
6. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 u:s. at 531; Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990) [hereinafter Smith].
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (1994).
8. The compelling interest test was set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 376 U.S. 398
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) [hereinafter O'Brien].
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requires a law regulating expressive behavior to be justified by
an important or substantial state interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of expression and insists that the restriction on free
expression be no greater than is essential to further that interest.10 On the other hand, the Court has stated that the incidental
effects of a generally applicable law do not violate the First
Amendment.U Further, the Free Exercise Clause decisions on
generally applicable laws have cited free speech cases as parallelsP The current recognition of a conflict between the O'Brien
test and the lack of scrutiny for generally applicable laws13 suggests that the Court soon may resolve the differences and make
its free speech decisions consistent with its free exercise jurisprudence. The O'Brien standard is under attack.
A determination that content-neutral generally applicable
laws are not subject to heightened scrutiny under the First
Amendment might be justified on the grounds that the Amendment is concerned with the purpose of the law rather than its
effect on the individual. Even if a purpose-centered vision of the
First Amendment is appropriate the Court should not lose its
balance and endanger both speech· and religion by engaging in
the direct search for purpose. Too often, even when an improper
purpose exists, it cannot be proved. Justice Scalia's "objective"
approach to determining legislative purpose 14 increases the difficulties of such proof and is therefore totally unsuitable for evaluating constitutionality under the First Amendment. But the
purpose inquiry will be underinclusive even if the Court considers the subjective statements of legislators, as it does when deter10. Jd. at 377; See also Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991)
(applying the O'Brien test).
11. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
12. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 886 n.3.

13. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
14. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558.
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mmmg whether a facially neutral classification with a
discriminatory impact has a forbidden purpose under the Equal
Protection Clause. A First Amendment test that relies on findings of purpose to invalidate laws permits unnecessary injury to
speech and religion.
The compelling interest test as applied to generally applicable laws, satisfies the claims of freedom of speech and the free
exercise of religion, but, applied uncritically, could hamper the
government's ability to act for legitimate purposes. The Court
should instead apply the O'Brien test because it assures both the
government's ability to accomplish its legitimate functions and
the protection of speech and religion from unnecessary
restriction.
II.

THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The majority of the Court has said that the incidental impact on religious exercise of a generally applicable law does not
require a compelling governmental interest to justify it. 15 Such
statements led Justice O'Connor to accuse the majority of giving
generally applicable laws a "talismanic" immunity from scrutiny
under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 16 This immunity may also extend to generally applicable laws affecting expression, since the Court has stated that its: free exercise
principles are closely related to those invoked for generally applicable laws that have an incidental impact on expression. 17
A.

The Free Exercise Inquiry

The Court's current position on the free exercise of religion
is complicated. The Court repudiated a "compelling interest"
First Amendment standard when scrutinizing a neutral, gener15. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
16. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. /d. at 878, 886 n.3; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
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ally applicable law, but it retained several anomalous exceptions.
The rejection of the "compelling governmental interest" test
does not necessarily foreclose the application of a lesser standard, but the Court has not suggested one. The majority is divided over the proper approach for determining whether a law is
neutral, and the Court has not established a standard for determining whether a law is generally applicable. Finally, the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act may have the
perverse result of freezing judicial interpretation of the free exercise of religion in its current confused condition. 18
1. Laws Targeted at Religious Exercise

The Court will invalidate laws that target religious beliefs,
including laws that punish behavior only when engaged in for
religious reasons. 19 There are two identifiable harms that result
from some religious beliefs. First, the beliefs themselves may be
deeply offensive to persons who disagree with them, and second,
they may prompt the believer to engage in socially harmful conduct. Prevention of the first injury is not a proper state interest
under our philosophy: The second may be dealt with by legislating against the harmful conduct rather than the belief. In Employment Division Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 20
Justice Scalia's majority opinion began its discussion of the First
Amendment in absolute terms:
1

The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right
to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.
Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmen18. Marci Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into
the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 357, 381 (1994); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The
Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 76-77
(1995).
19. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535~40.
20. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
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tal regulation of religious beliefs as such." The government may
not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression
of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend
its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious
authority or dogma. 21

Conduct conforming to religious beliefs, however, may
threaten interests that society legitimately can protect. The
Court has long recognized the dichotomy between abstract belief
and religiously based actions. 22 But the dichotomy may also be
misleading. A law that prohibits an action only when that action
is engaged in for religious reasons targets belief rather than behavior. Such a classification is supported only by the illegitimate
interest in suppressing belief.
It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved
the point), that a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when
they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the
religious belief that they display.Z3

A few years after Justice Scalia wrote .these words, the hypothetical became reality. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. Hialeah 24 the Justices agreed that a city's ordinances forbidding animal sacrifices were directed unconstitutionally at behavior only when the behavior was engaged in for religious reasons,
specifically the exercise of the Santeria religion of the Church of

21. /d. at 877 (citations omitted).
22. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
23. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. The attempt to protect persons from acts of racial or
religious discrimination has not been regarded as posing serious First Amendment
problems, unless the act itself was the utterance of words. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993). The perpetrator's beliefs are relevant to the protection of the
victim from harmful acts and they are proscribed only when manifested by such acts.
24. 508

u.s. 520 (1993).
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Lukumi Babalu Aye. 25 The ordinances failed the strict scrutiny
test. 26
The Court unanimously held that Hialeah's ordinances were
not neutral and generally applicable, but the Justices did not produce a unanimous opinion. 27 They disagreed over whether laws
that target religion are per se invalid, on the proper method to
ascertain whether legislation is neutral and generally applicable,
and on the proper test to be applied to neutral, generally applicable laws.
2.

Neutrality and General Applicability

Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lukumi referred
to a "requirement" of neutrality and general applicability. He
noted that " [n ]eutrality and general applicability are interrelated."28 Neutrality is determined by the object of the law. 29
General applicability involves categories of selection. 30 Any law
affecting religion must use the proper means ("general applica25.
26.
27.
28.

/d. at 545.
/d. at 546.
/d. at 546, 531.
/d. at 531.

29. Justice Scalia defined "neutrality" as governed by the face of the statute while
"general applicability" dealt with the object of the statute:
In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by
their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion ... ; whereas the defect of lack
of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their
terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a
particular religion for discriminatory treatment.
/d. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Souter argued that neutrality was not limited to the object of the law, but applied to its effect as well:
(O]ur common notion of neutrality is broad enough to cover not merely what might
be called formal neutrality, which as a free-exercise requirement would only bar
laws with an object to discriminate against religion, but also what might be called
substantive neutrality, which, in addition to demanding a secular object, would generally require government to accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws.
/d. at 561-62 (Souter, J., concurring).
30. /d. at 542.
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bility") to achieve a proper end ("neutrality"). Neutrality analysis often invokes overbreadth - where the burden on religious
exercise is not necessary to satisfy legitimate government interests, the overbreadth reveals that the law's object· is to burden
religion. 31 General applicability analysis invokes underinclusiveness - where religious exercise is burdened while non-religious
behavior threatening similar legitimate interests of government
is. not. 32 The category used by the underinclusive law is too narrow, even ifa legitimate interest of government is satisfied. Of
course, the narrow categorization also indicates that the object
of the law was to burden religion.
Neutrality and general applicability are requirements for
the validity of laws under the Free Exercise Clause because
there is no legitimate state interest that justifies violating them.
Restriction of religion is not a legitimate object of any law.
While the law may deal with harm caused by religion, such harm
is unlikely to be unique to religion .. Thus, a classification limited
to religion carries on its face the indicia of illegitimate purpose.
Justices O'Connor and Blackmun said "regulation that targets
religion in this way, ipso facto, fails strict scrutiny. "33 Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion avoided a per se rule, but it will be
difficult for any such law to satisfy his requirement that it be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government
interest. 34
a.

Neutrality

Justice Kennedy stated in Lukumi that "if the object of a
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their reli31. See id. at 538-39.
32. See id. at 543-45.
33. /d. at 579.
34. See id. at 531-32.
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gious motivation, the law is not neutral." 35 Some laws are invalid on their face, but facially neutral laws also may have an
improper object. "Official action that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance
with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked,
as well as overt. " 36
Justice Kennedy focused on the text of a resolution passed
simultaneously with the ordinances, the discriminatory impact of
the ordinances, and their overbreadth to unmask their hostility
to the Santeria religion. 37 This portion of his opinion received
no objections. 38 Justice Kennedy's next step, however, provoked
disagreement. Citing the analysis of neutrality in equal protection cases, Justice Kennedy used the statements made by members of the decisionmaking body during the hearings to show
that the object of the law was to burden religion. 39
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist protested this use
of statements made in the course of the political process. They
35. /d. at 533.
36. /d. at 534.
37. /d. at 526-29, 535-40. The overbreadth and underinclusiveness analysis applied
to only three of the ordinances. /d. at 535-40. The Court struck down a fourth ordinance that was passed the same day as the others and also effectively prohibited
Santeria practices. /d. at 540. The Court said that all four ordinances might be treated
as a group for neutrality purposes, because "[i)t would be implausible to suggest" that
only the first three ordinances "had as their object the suppression of religion." /d.
38. This part of the opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Thomas. Justice Blackmun's concurrence, in which Justice O'Connor joined, did not
discuss the evidence for finding the ordinances were not neutral but did find the law
discriminated against religion as such. /d. at 579. Justice Souter's concurrence also
stated that prohibiting religion was "the object of the laws" without further pursuing
the analysis. /d. at 559. Justice White did not write separately, but refused to join this
portion of the opinion. It seems unlikely that Justice White objected to the analysis of
the evidence, and more likely that it was the separation of the categories of neutrality
and laws of general applicability that drew his objection.
39. /d. at 541-42.

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 210 1996-1997

1997)

GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

211

distinguished between the object of the laws and the subjective
motivation of the lawmakers, stating "(t]he First Amendment
does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact laws,
but to the effects of the laws enacted . . . . This does not put us in
the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of
their authors." 40
b.

General Applicability

Justice Kennedy's discussion of the general applicability of
the laws avoided consideration of legislative motive. He said
that government, "in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by
religious belief. "41 Justice Kennedy did not define the standard
for general applicability, but noted that the ordinances in question fell well below the minimum standard. 42 This portion of his
opinion was controversial only because it suggested that a neutral, generally applicable law needed no further scrutiny. The
Justices agreed that the ordinances were not generally applicable
laws in view of their text and their failure to reach non-religious
behavior that posed similar secular problems for society. 43
3. The Exemption from First Amendment Scrutiny for
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws
The law targeting religion stands at one extreme. The law
forbidding murder is at another. The neutrality of a law is evidence that it responds to legitimate concerns and that injury to
religion is not its object. The general applicability of the law
confirms this. For Justice O'Connor, the neutrality and general
40. Id. at 558.
41. Id. at 543.
42. Id. Justice Souter commented that "general applicability is, for the most part,
self-explanatory." Id. at 561 (Souter, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 545-46.
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applicability of the law are merely evidence of a legitimate state
interest, not reasons to change the standard for evaluating that
interest. For her, the First Amendment requires the interest to
be compelling to sustain a state law that restricts religious
exercise. 44
The majority of the Court has been troubled over where to
draw the line if it exempts religious conduct from generally ap- ,
plicable laws. Weighing the values at stake in particular cases:
tends to become arbitrary in practice and provides little guidance to lower courts. The more stringent the free exercise test,
the more situations where government (here the Cour:t) .compels
a disparity of treatment favoring religious believers. This raises
concerns from another section of the First Amendment - the
Establishment Clause. 45 The Court responded to these problems.
by jettisoning the "compelling interest" test.
Where the Court finds a law to be both neutral and generally applicable, it will not apply strict scrutiny to the law's impact
on religious exercise. For example, Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion in Lukumi cited Smith for the proposition that:
In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of
religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law
that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified
by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.46
The statement left open the possibility that the First Amendment requires neutral laws ofgeneral applicability to meet some
44. This is, of course, a gross simplification. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1985) (no heightened scrutiny where planned government road on public land would disrupt religious use of land by Indian tribes since
no one was coerced into violating their beliefs nor penalized by denial of any right or
benefit enjoyed by others).
45. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58

u. CHI. L. REV. 308, 320 (1991).
46. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
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intermediate test, such as serving an important or substantial
government interest, to justify imposing such a burden on reli.
.
g10us exerctse.
It is very unlikely that Justice Kennedy intended his opinion
to support an intermediate standard. Justice Souter, in his
Lukumi concurrence, attacked Justice Kennedy for failing to repudiate Smith. The Smith opinion, written by Justice Scalia, received the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Stevens, and White. Justice Scalia's majority opinion
in Smith did not simply negate the compelling government interest test, but suggested that neutrality and general applicability
insulated the law from First Amendment challenge. "[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of
a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended."47
The Court must examine laws affecting religious exercise to
determine whether they are generally applicable and whether
the object of the law is neutral. According to Justice Scalia,
however, satisfaction of those tests is sufficient. 48 A neutral,
generally applicable law that burdens the exercise of religion is
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 49
Although Justice Souter urged the Court in his Lukumi concurrence to reexamine Smith, the current Court, while differing
I

47. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
48. Justice Scalia observed that the Court has held "that general laws not specifically targeted at religious practices did not require heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they diminished some people's ability to practice their religion."
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (Scalia J., concurring) (citing
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885).
49. Justice Souter's Lukumi concurrence characterized Smith as stating that "if
prohibiting the exercise of religion results from enforcing a 'neutral, generally applicable' law, the Free Exercise Clause has not been offended." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559.
(Souter, J., concurring).
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over criteria for determining neutrality, appears to support
Smith's holding. 5° If neutrality and general applicability insulate
a statute regardless of its impact on the particular exercise of
religion, the Court must be focusing on the government's behavior rather than that of the religious practitioner. Thus, Smith assumes that the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause protects
only against government action with the forbidden object of
harming religion.
'

4.

''

Free Exercise Anomalies

Justice Souter joined the chorus of commentators who find
the Smith rationale at war with decisions it purportedly distinguished, stating "[w]e are left with a free-exercise jurisprudence
in tension with itself. "51 Justice Scalia attempted in Smith to distinguish cases like Sherbert v. Verner. 52 Sherbert and its successors held that the state could not deny unemployment .
compensation to individuals who lost their jobs because their
religious beliefs conflicted with their job requirements. 53 The
Smith opinion found the Sherbert line of cases applicable only to
laws where there is in place a system of individualized exemptions,54 but Smith, like Sherbert, was an unemployment compen50. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, and White joined in Smith.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 873. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor took a
different view of the proper rule. /d. at 891. In Lukumi, Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor reaffirmed their disagreement with Smith and Justice Souter appeared ready
to join them. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 577-80, 559-77. Justice Thomas, who replaced Justice
Marshall on the bench, joined in the sections of Justice Kennedy's Lukumi opinion that
spoke approvingly of Smith. /d. at 522. Thus, even if Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
oppose the rule of Smith, five votes remain in support- Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas.
51. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564.
52. 374

u.s. 398 (1963).

53. See id. at 410.
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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sation case. Further, the distinction itself is problematic. 55
Almost every rule of law creates individualized exemptions at
some level of abstraction. For example, the prohibition against
murder seems to be a law of general application, but the general
prohibition against taking another's life doesn't apply to self-defense, military necessity, or even to accidents not amounting to
criminal negligence. This may be described as the definition of a
law of general applicability whose application to religious murder raises no First Amendment problems, or it may equally well
be described as a system of individualized exemptions whose
failure to include actions taken for religious reasons requires a
showing of a compelling governmental interest. There is no objective basis offered to distinguish which laws fit into which category. The underlying question remains why the particular law
sanctions the behavior when it is religiously motivated.
Justice Scalia's claim that other decisions supporting free
exercise claims against general criminal laws, like Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 56 mixed another constitutional right with the free exercise
claim is not reflected in the language of those opinions. As Justice Souter suggested in Lukumi, the peyote users in Smith also
might claim free expression or privacy rights, so Smith is not
distinguishable. 57
The weaknesses of the distinctions do not .mean that the
Court will overrule either Smith or those cases that point in another direction. In Lukumi, Justice Kennedy used the "individualized exemptions from a generalized requirement" analysis as
part of the rationale for invalidating the Florida ordinance that
55. See John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise
Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REv. 71, 74 (1991} (arguing that the
Smith Court incorrectly distinguished "between types of cases in which the Court must
weigh the competing interests of the individual and the government.").
56. 406

u.s. 205 (1972).

57. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
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forbade "unnecessary" killing of animals. 58 Assuming the constitutional issue comes before it again, the Court will choose the
line of cases which it finds most appropriate. One way it may
reconcile the cases is to find that certain exemptions raise issues
over the law's purpose and thus suggest that the law is not generally applicable. 59
5. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act may avert the reexamination of Smith that Souter called for in Lukumi. 60 That
would be ironic because one purpose of the Act (which sharply
criticizes Smith) is to "restore the compelling interest test. "61
Even more perverse, as a result of the Act, the next test of the
Smith doctrine in the Court may find Congress implicitly supporting it.
In the future, any person whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by state government will claim it is a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if the
plaintiff also raises a constitutional claim, the Court could give
58. Id. at 537.
59. See infra Part II.C for an attempt to explain the decisions in terms of the likely
purpose of the law.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). See also Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, BYU L. REv. 221, 254-55 (1993).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb provides in pertinent part:
(a) Findings
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.
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relief under the statute without reaching the plaintiff's constitutional objection.
The Court will examine the Act's constitutionality. 62 The
statute makes no attempt to tie its operation to effects on commerce but apparently relied on Congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that
Amendment. 63 The scope of that power remains controversial. 64
Several scholars have questioned whether Section 5 is sufficient
to support the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,65 and several
others have asserted that it is not. 66 Nevertheless, the current
Court may well uphold the Act.
62. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 421
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074).
63. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that an activity must
"substantially affect" interstate commerce to be within Congress's power to regulate it
under the Commerce Clause). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
(holding that "[s]ection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for
and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.") /d. at 642.
64. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 389. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (limiting the scope of§ 5).
65. "The constitutionality of this legislation ... raises a number of questions involving the extent of Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994). See Ira Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1, 52-66 (1993); Scott C. Idleman,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73
TEX. L. REV. 247, 285-322 (1994).
66. The precedents have involved the prevention of race discrimination, the core of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court might not give Congress as
much leeway with respect to enforcing the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. See Jay
S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1624-33 (1995) (First Amendment is disability on Congress creating implied immunity in states from congressional
regulation, and Section 5 does not affirmatively empower Congress to change the relationship); Conkle, supra note 18, at 61-78 (arguing that the Act frustrates the primary
function of the Court as interpreter); Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Why
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437,46069 (1994) (arguing that the Act conflicts with the Court's substantive judgment of con-
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Justices O'Connor and Souter, opponents of the Smith standard, should have no difficulty in sustaining the statute as simply
providing procedures to vindicate the Constitutional right of free
exercise of religion against state interference. Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg might well agree. If so, only one more vote from
among the supporters of Smith would be necessary to uphold the
Act.
Smith's supporters may find the statute constitutional without changing their views or acknowledging any superior power
of constitutional interpretation in Congress. Just as Congress
was permitted to ban the use of literacy tests in elections because
they could be used to discriminate against racial and ethnic
groups,67 it may ban laws that substantially burden religious exercise without showing a compelling interest because such burdens could be imposed for the impermissible object of harming
religion. Given the difficulties of determining the object of a
law, some overbreadth is necessary to assure that no law with the
improper objective of suppressing religious exercise is enacted.
Thus, the statute enforces the command of the Fourteenth
Amendment (incorporating the First) that government not
abridge the free exercise of religion, even though the statute
reaches government action that is not itself violative of the
Amendment. If the Court follows this reasoning, it could uphold

stitutional value); and Hamilton, supra note 18, at 387-96 (arguing that Congress is an
inappropriate body to enforce First Amendment incorporation against states because
the constitutional provision indicates suspicion of Congress).
Further, a congressional mandate of religious "accommodation" unless a compelling interest is shown arguably violates the command of the First Amendment that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. See Idleman, supra
note. 65, at 285-302 (suggesting this is an open question); Eisgruber and Sager, supra
note 66, at 452-60 (arguing that the Act violates the Establi.shment Clause).
67. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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the Religious Freedom Restoration Act without reconsidering its
opinion in Smith. 68
·
The Act may even ironically support Smith. It states that it
applies to federal legislation, including subsequent enactments,
unless they explicitly refer to the Act and exclude application. 69
Since one Congress cannot disable its successor from passing a
law, this provision should be understood as a guide to interpretation. Courts should construe federal statutes to contain, in effect, an accommodation clause, i.e. federal laws do not apply
where their application would substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion unless the application furthers a compelling
governmental interest. 70 If a federal statute expressly negates
any accommodation clause, the Court would have to reach the
constitutional issue. 71 Under those circumstances, the implicit
68. See Bonnie Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996); Douglas Laycock,
Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 883, 897
(1994); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, BYU L. REv. 221,
254-55 (1993); Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:Legislative Choice
and Judicial Review, BYU L. REv. 73, 90-94 (1993); and Matt Pawa, Comment: When
the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1993).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (a) (1994).
70. A court may find that the legislature intended a subsequently enacted statute to
apply to a religious exercise despite the absence of explicit reference to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. See Gordon Young, Some Reflections on Gramm-RudmanHollings, 45 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1986); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of
Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185 (1986). Explicit exclusion of the Act is tantamount to an admission that Congress believes its statute imposes
a substantial burden on religion that is not justified by a compelling interest. Rather
than make such an admission, Congress might specify that a particular statute should
apply to all persons "regardless of any impact on the religious exercise of any individual." This is particularly likely if the Court construed an earlier version of the statute to
be inapplicable to a religious exercise because of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.
71. It is possible, but unlikely, that the Court could duck the issue. Even if the
Court previously construed a similar statute to be inapplicable to religious exercise be-
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position of Congress would support the rule in Smith, if necessary to uphold its statute.
B.

The Free Speech Inquiry

There is a close relationship between the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause and the Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment. Smith cited cases on freedom of the press to support the
proposition that the First Amendment is not offended by the incidental effect of an otherwise valid law of general application. 72
Similarly, in Lukumi, Justice Kennedy said, "The principle underlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in
our First Amendment jurisprudence. "73
cause of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Court might find the reenactment
with an express negation of any religious exemption corrects the Court's construction
and provides evidence that the government interest is compelling. Thus, the new statute may be sustained as satisfying a compelling interest without forcing the court to
reassess whether an interest of lesser magnitude would be sufficient under the
Constitution.
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 886 n.3 (citing Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
394 U.S. 131 (1969) for the proposition that "generally applicable laws unconcerned
with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby
become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment.").
73. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. In support of this statement, he cited cases on freedom of speech and establishment of religion.
With respect to the requirement of general applicability, Justice Kennedy wrote
for six members of the Court, including Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, Thomas and
White. A neutral law that burdens religious exercise is usually a law of general application. There are few legitimate state interests (other than the prevention of discrimination against religion) that require a law that operates only in the area of religion. That
is particularly true because the establishment clause protects against state support of
religion just as the free exercise clause protects against burdening it. Thus, there has
been little need to develop the notion of the "generally applicable" law in free exercise
jurisprudence separate from analysis of the "neutrality" of the law.
On the other hand, content-neutral laws affecting free speech may be limited to
categories of expression. The Federal Communications Commission regulates cable
and broadcast media; local and state laws regulate time, place and manner for speech in
public forums. Such laws may be content-neutral, but they are not of general applica-
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There are significant differences in the problems posed by
speech and religion. Unlike the situation with respect to the free
exercise of religion, the lack of general applicability for a regulation affecting speech does not demonstrate the absence of legitimate state interests. There are many reasons to regulate
communication apart from the message being communicated, including concern over volume and conflicts with other uses of
space. Valid content-neutral laws that are not generally applicable are common. Nevertheless, a content-neutral regulation that
applies only to means of expression invites scrutiny. "[L]aws
that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special
treatment 'pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,' ...
and so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened
First Amendment scrutiny." 74 They still may pose significant
dangers to expression, and may either be manipulated or be
designed to hinder groups with particular views or to exclude
particular topics from public debate.
The general applicability of a law provides some assurance
that the law is not designed to harm the expression of ideas, but
general applicability alone does not protect against content discrimination to the extent it protects religious beliefs. Normally,
generally applicable laws that affect free exercise are regulations
of conduct enforced without regard to the content of the beliefs
of individuals engaging in that conduct. Thus, the application of
the law to conduct engaged in for religious reasons does not
raise suspicions of hostility to religion.
In speech cases, however, the impairment often occurs because the state claims that the content of the speech comes
within the statutory scope of a generally applicable law, e.g.
breach of the peace, obstruction of the draft, intentional infiicbility. The Court rarely receives a challenge based on a free speech claim to a neutral
law of general applicability.
74. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
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tion of emotional harm. Thus, such laws are not ultimately content-neutral, and their application to speech raises a suspicion of
animus toward the ideas expressed. 75 It is only where the generally applicable law regulates conduct regardless of the ideas expressed that the issue of the impact on free speech becomes
analogous to that of free exercise.
The question is whether the Court will give heightened scrutiny to neutral and generally applicable laws that impact expressive conduct. The Court may be in the process of transition on
this issue, moving from an intermediate level of scrutiny toward
the absence of scrutiny adopted in its free exercise decisions.
1. The Conflict in the Cases

In Turner, Justice Kennedy underscored the Court's confusion: "the enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may
not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment."76 Cohen v. Cowles Media 77 and Barnes v. Glen Theater,
Inc. ,78 decided in the same term, upheld laws that applied to expressive activity on the same basis as laws that applied to nonexpressive activities. Like ships passing in the night, the two decisions took no notice of each other as they approached the issue
of generally applicable laws under the First Amendment from
opposite directions.
75. Words are often used as an essential part of a course of conduct that is punishable, e.g. fraud, intimidation, blackmail, copyright violation. Libel, obscenity, and fighting words are punishable by laws that would be hard to call "content-neutral." The
Court gives careful scrutiny to these laws and has created a variety of tests dependant
upon context to deal with laws affecting speech that are not content neutral, but such
laws may be sustained.
76. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458 (comparing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 670, (1991) with Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1991)).
77. 501
78. 501

u.s. 663 (1991).
u.s. 560 (1991).
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Barnes v. Glen Theater- The O'Brien Test

In Barnes, the plaintiffs sued to enjoin the application of Indiana's public indecency statute to nude dancing. The statute
forbade nudity in public. On its face, the prohibition applied regardless of any expressive intent on the part of the nude individual - whether dancing, walking, standing, or sleeping. The
State argued that regulation of public nudity was a permissible
"time, place or manner" regulation of expression. 79
The Court began its analysis by determining that the conduct in question, nude dancing, was protected expression. 80 It
then looked to the level of protection to be afforded such expression. The Court found the appropriate standard for laws regulating expressive conduct in O'Brien, which upheld the application
to a war protestor of a statute punishing the burning of a draft
card. 81 O'Brien stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms." 82 The O'Brien test sustains a regulation that is otherwise within the scope of government power if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. "83

79. Id. at 566.
80. Id. at 565-66.
81. 391

u.s. 367 (1968).

82. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
83. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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O'Brien applies not only to time, place, or manner regulations of speech,84 but also to laws of general applicability- after
all, the prohibition on burning a draft card applied regardless of
any expressive motivation. Portions of the O'Brien test overlap
the neutrality tests used by Justice Kennedy in Lukumi. If a law
cannot be justified by any interest unrelated to suppression or if
its impact on expression is not necessary to further any legitimate interest, the Court may find that its object is not speechneutral.85 Unlike Justice Kennedy's neutrality test, however,
O'Brien rejected any inquiry into the actual motives of the legislators. In this respect, it is consonant with the views of Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist. On the other hand, O'Brien does not exempt the narrowly tailored, facially neutral law from further
First Amendment scrutiny, since it requires that a challenged law
further an important or substantial governmental interest. 86
In Barnes, eight Justices divided evenly on the outcome of
the case under the standards of O'Brien. 87 Justice Scalia, who

468

84. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
u.s. 288 (1984)).
85. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32.
86. O'Brien, 501 U.S. at 376-77.

87. Justice Rehnquist found that the statute furthered a substantial government
interest in protecting order and morality, that the interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and that the statute was narrowly tailored to that end. Barnes,
501 U.S. at 560-61. Justice Souter's concurrence found the statute furthered the ends of
combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, such as prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal activity. /d. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). The
four dissenting Justices noted the lack of enforcement against nudity in theatrical productions, and contended that the selectivity of enforcement showed the state's interest
was in suppressing the mode of expression. /d. at 590 (White, J., dissenting). They
argued that the interest of the general public nudity statute was to protect the public
from offense, but that rationale was inapplicable to performances before a consenting
audience. !d. at 595. They concluded that the statute was not narrowly drawn to satisfy
the legitimate state interests. The dissent analyzed the case to show that it failed the
O'Brien test used by Justices Rehnquist and Souter, and also the test for neutrality
urged by Justice Scalia, but they did not independently set forth their own analytic
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cast the deciding vote, repudiated O'Brien. He supported the
Indiana public indecency law because, "as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all." 88 Further, "the only
First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do not directly
or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether
the purpose of the law is to suppress communication. If not, that
is the end of the matter so far as the First Amendment guarantees are concerned. "89 Distinguishing expressive conduct from
speech, Justice Scalia argued that the First Amendment does not
apply to laws that affect expressive conduct unless their purpose
is to suppress communication. 90
framework. Justice White did conclude that "our cases require us to affirm absent a
compelling state interest supporting the statute." /d. at 595.
88. /d. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. /d. at 578 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia was quoting from his own dissenting opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
90. According to Justice Scalia, any law that restricts "speech," even for a reason
unrelated to suppression of communication, must meet a high standard to be justified
under the First Amendment. He pointed out, however, that the language of the First
Amendment protects "speech" and "press" and does not explicitly include "expression"
that is neither written nor oral. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576. Thus, he concluded that the
First Amendment standards applicable to speech and press did not apply to expressive
conduct. /d. He recognized, however, an implicit guarantee of freedom of expression
that protected against laws whose purpose was to suppress the communicative content
of conduct. Justice Scalia referred to the "more generalized guarantee of freedom of
expression" which "makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis
for singling out that conduct for proscription." /d. at 578 (emphasis in original).
This linguistic argument should not be pressed too far. Justice Scalia stated that
the Court had already adopted his approach to regulations of conduct in free exercise
cases. /d. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). But Smith undermines any argument that First Amendment standards vary according to a distinction between explicit and implicit guarantees.
The Court used the purpose-centered inquiry in Smith as the standard for determining
the violation of an explicit guarantee. The First Amendment forbids any law that prohibits the free exercise of religion. It does not distinguish between religious belief and
religious conduct, and thus provides no justification for using different levels of scru-
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[V]irtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose - if
only expressive of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohibition . . . . It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that
every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a general
law regulating conduct pass normal First Amendment scrutiny, or
even ... that it be justified by an "important or substantial" government interest.91

Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion acknowledged that almost limitless types of conduct may be expressive, but he responded that the Court rejected this expansive notion of
expressive conduct. He found that nude dancing is expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment, but his opinion offered no criteria for determining when an expressive activity is
protected by the First Amendment. 92 None of the members of
the Court directly critiqued Justice Scalia's distinction between
expressive conduct and speech in this case, or his contention that
the generally applicable law that incidentally affects expressive
conduct is not subject to the First Amendment. They simply applied O'Brien.

tiny. Justice Scalia himself noted, "the 'exercise of religion' often involves not only
belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. The purpose-centered inquiry for laws affecting religious or
expressive conduct, therefore, is more policy oriented than derived from language.
Conduct poses greater problems to society than belief, so the state more easily can
justify regulations that affect religious conduct. However, the greater likelihood that
conduct regulations will meet a constitutional standard does not justify reducing the
level of constitutional scrutiny.
91. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576-77.
92. The issue is an important and difficult one. All behavior may be said in some
way to express the nature of the individual. Our choices of clothes, housing, jobs, and
toothpaste communicate something about our identity to others. We may speak of
those choices as "expressions" of our personality. Nevertheless, communication of
ideas is not the purpose of those actions. The First Amendment will be invoked only
when the communication of ideas is a substantial basis for engaging in that behavior.
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Cohen v. Cowles Media

While Barnes appears to demonstrate that the Court will
apply the O'Brien tests to a law of general application that affects expressive conduct, Cowles93 supports the proposition that
the First Amendment does not apply to such a law. Cohen
sought damages against a newspaper for breach of its promise
not to reveal his identity as an informant. 94 The Court held that
his promissory estoppel action was not barred by the First
Amendment. 95 Justice White's majority opinion referred to the
"well established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because
their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news. "96 Justice White seemed
to view Cowles as an attempt by the media to gain an exemption
from laws applicable to others, citing the line of cases that denied the media special treatment. But Justice Blackmun's dissent pointed out that Cowles' claim was based on the content of
the speech and. not the identity of the speaker. 97
The dissenters distinguished the decisions Justice White
cited: "this case does not fall within the line of authority holding
the press to laws of general applicability where commercial ac93. 501 u.s. 663 {1991).
94. /d. at 666.
95. /d. at 670.
96. /d. at 669. The Court cited a series of cases in which it refused to grant the
press greater rights than individuals under the First Amendment. /d. (citations omitted). Justice White made the point that a newspaper publisher '"has no special immunity from the application of general laws."' /d. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). Thus, Justice White said, "enforcement of such
general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to
enforcement against other persons or organizations." /d. The importance of Cowles
does not lie in its invocation of caselaw but in its suggestion that laws regulating conduct without regard to whether such conduct is expressive do not violate the First
Amendment.
97. /d. at 673.
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tivities and relationships, not the content of publication, are at
issue. " 98 Although the law of promissory estoppel is contentneutral (the state does not determine the content of the forbidden behavior: the individual does so by her promise) and is of
general application (most of its specific applications are to conduct other than speech), its effect in this case made the press
liable for damages for publishing specific information. Where
the law operates to forbid a specific statement, the dissenters insisted that it is subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Quoting
from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith, the dissenters said "[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of
general applicability. "99
Rather than weighing the interests of society against the
speech interests impaired, the Justices in the majority did seem
to find a talisman in the general applicability of the law. They
characterized the law's inhibition on truthful reporting of a
source's identity as the "incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence" of a generally applicable law. 100
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability. It does not target
or single out the press. Rather, in so far as we are advised, the
doctrine is generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the
citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment does not forbid its
application to the press. 101

The distinction that Justice Scalia drew in Barnes between
speech and expressive conduct vanished in this opinion - naming a source in writing appears to be protected by the express
language of the First Amendment, yet Justice Scalia joined Justice White's opinion in finding the impact on the press "constitu98. !d. at 676-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99. /d. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. /d. at 672.

101. /d. at 670.
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tionally insignificant." 102 The crucial factor seemed to be that
the law was content-neutral in the sense that its application to
the content of Cowles' speech was a product of Cowles' independent action. This made it analogous for the majority to the
media exemption claim cases. 103
The Court in Barnes applied the "important and substantial
governmental interest" test of O'Brien as the appropriate standard for a law affecting expressive conduct, while the Court did
not attempt to evaluate the government interest in Cowles.
None of the judges in Cowles even mentioned the O'Brien line
of cases. The distinction in the cases between expressive conduct
and expression cut against the way in which they were decided.
One would think the Court would be embarrassed to give nude
dancing more scrutiny than it gave the press, yet it did so.
The Cowles Court did not mention Barnes or attempt to distinguish that case. As the Cowles dissent pointed out, the majority's precedents denied media an exemption from general
business laws whose only impact on speech or press was that
they impose the same costs of doing business on the media as
were imposed on all other businesses. 104 The incident to which
the law attached in those cases was not expressive conduct, but
normal business practices such as receiving revenue 105 or employing workers. 106 But Cowles went beyond those cases to vali102. /d. at 672. In Smith, Justice Scalia treated a general tax that fell on the press
just as he treated regulations of expressive conduct in Barnes. He wrote in Smith that
"if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the
object ... but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
103. See Cowles, 501 U.S. at 669.
104. /d. at 676-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 581 (1983) (applicability of corporate tax rates to bookstores).
106. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (application of labor laws to
news service).
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date, without further analysis, a generally applicable law that
resulted in a direct impact on speech.
Perhaps the best explanation for the decision in Cowles was
offered by Srikanth Srinivasan in a perceptive article on incidental restrictions of speech. 107 Srinivasan argued that whether gen"7
erally applicable laws that incidentally restrict speech are subject
to First Amendment standards depends "on the likelihood of a
speech-suppressive administrative motivation. " 108 This . theorY.
reconciles the majority opinions in Barnes, Cowles, and the line
of decisions that relied on Cowles. Where the law is triggered by
conduct that has a significant expressive element (like the nude
dancing in Barnes), there is a danger that the l!lw was motivated
by _a desire to suppress expression. There is a significant chance
that enforcement decisions will also be affected by the concern
to suppress. Srinivasan contended that the threat of a speech
restrictive motive underlies the statement in Arcara v. Cloud
Books109 that general laws that do not target expression raise
First Amendment problems only "where it was conduct with a
significant expressive element that drew the legal remedy in the
first place, ... or where [the law] has the inevitable effect of
singling out those engaged in expressive activity." 110 In Cowles,
however, there was no First Amendment problem because the
decision to invoke the generally applicable law was not made by
the government but by a private individual. 111 Thus, Srinivasan
107. Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment:
A Motive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 12 CaNST. CoMMENTARY 401 {1995).
108. /d. at 420.
109. 478 u.s. 697 {1986).
110. /d. at 706-07.
111. There are several other differences that make Cowles less likely than Barnes to
be a product of a desire to restrict speech. First, the restriction in Cowles applied only
to the newspaper and did not prevent others from identifying Cohen as the source, but
the restriction in Barnes precluded the specific form of expression for everyone. Second, the public indecency statute may have had a closer nexus to conduct associated

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 230 1996-1997

1997]

GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

231

said, "the unstated underpinning of the Court's decision may
well be the impossibility of an illicit administrative motive." 112
That is why Cowles may appropriately be treated like the press
cases it cites in which the law is unlikely to have any speechsuppressive motive because the activity that invokes its operation is not itself expressive.
Srinivasan's article explains the decisions, but the principle
'it avows was not stated as a standard for decision. First Amendment questions are raised whenever a law has a negative impact
on some expression. Whether a particular law is susceptible to
speech-suppressive motivation often is not an easy judgment.
Does a law like promissory estoppel become particularly attractive because it may be used to suppress information? If the government can predict which private individuals are likely to use
the law and which situations are likely to be most common, it
might adopt a privately enforced law of general applicability for'
a speech-suppressive reason.
Assuming that concern with the possibility of speech-suppressive motivation is at the base of the Court's decisions, the
Court might prefer to use standards of decision that focus on
identifying the purpose of the law. According to Srinivasan's
analysis, laws triggered by expressive conduct should almost always be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.U 3 But
with expression than the doctrine of promissory estoppel, i.e. individuals are more
likely to engage in public nudity as a means of expression than to violate their representations as a means of expression. Third, expression restricted by promissory estoppel
may take many forms, but the expression limited by the public indecency statute is
primarily of a sexual nature. Thus, the possibility that the object of the Indiana law was
repression of sexual expression was greater than the likelihood that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel was designed to stop publication of the names of sources. Fourth,
the Indiana statute criminalized the behavior, while promissory estoppel simply results
in liability for damages.
112. Srinivansan, supra note 107, at 420.
113. Id. at 401.
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Srinivasan did not apply the analysis to free exercise cases, and it
is inconsistent with Smith where there was no heightened scrutiny for a law that regulated a religious ritual. The Court has not
expressly adopted Srinivasan's principle, and it may instead follow Justice Scalia's lead to a purpose based standard which reconciles its free speech cases with its free exercise decisions.
Cowles might be justified on the grounds that the contentneutrality of the restrictions at issue in the earlier media cases
were what insulated those generally applicable laws from First
Amendment scrutiny. This view of Cowles raises the possibility
that the Court may now exempt content-neutral generally applicable laws from further scrutiny. O'Brien's standard may be
eliminated from the expressive conduct arena of its birth as it is
transformed into the standard for regulations of time, place, and
manner of speech. Justice Kennedy highlighted that possibility
with his suggestion that Barnes (the expressive conduct case relying on O'Brien) and Cowles (generally applicable law not subject to scrutiny) are inconsistent. 114 His casual comment in
Turner that generally applicable laws "may or may not be subject
to heightened scrutiny" may be the death knell to O'Brien.U 5
2. The Pressure to Equalize the Standards
Justice Scalia has argued that the principle of Smith is even
more important for scrutinizing expressive conduct under the
First Amendment. "Relatively few can plausibly assert that their
illegal conduct is being engaged in for religious reasons; but almost anyone can violate almost any law as a means of expression."116 In effect~ the same concerns that drove the Court's
114. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
115. /d.
116. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring). But one can posit a religious
belief in natural law that scorns manmade laws and makes the violation of law a religious exercise. We have not lacked for unusual religious beliefs.
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decision in Smith, the concerns abo.ut balancing as a judicial
technique together with an unease about treating people unequally as a result of their subjective intentions, are also in free
expression cases.
It is anomalous to give more protection to expressive conduct than to conduct engaged in for religious reasons. Religious
exercise often involves expression protected by the Free Speech
Clause, but sometimes it is a private act with no communicative
aspects. Regulation of those private religious acts has more serious consequences for the free exercise of religion than regulation of expressive conduct has for free expression. Regulation of
expressive conduct does not foreclose the expression of the idea,
although it may diminish the audience and result in the loss of
some precision or force in the expression. For example, if. flag
burning is prohibited, the individual can still say why the flag
should be burned and can even conjure up the image of the flag,
burning. Regulation of religious conduct, on the other hand,
may result in totally banning a religious exercise. For example,
prohibiting alcohol consumption makes it illegal for a worshipper to partake of the blood of Christ. The substitution of grape
juice is likely to destroy the significance of the rite for believers
in transubstantiation. Thus, since religious exercise actually
needs more protection from generally applicable laws regulating
conduct than does free speech, it is wrongheaded to give it less
protection.
Ultimately, the Court will realize that free exercise is entitled to the same protections as free expression. The issue is
whether parity requires that the protection for the exercise of
religion be raised to the level afforded expression, or whether
the level of protection afforded expression should be reduced to
the level given the exercise of religion.
The pressure to equalize standards for free speech and free
exercise may direct the Court to a position that inquires only as
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to the law's neutrality and general applicability.U 7 The proposition that the incidental effect of a generally applicable law on
religion is constitutionally insignificant depends on a view of the
First Amendment centered on the purpose of the law rather than
the effect on the speaker. That view may have force with respect
to the Free Speech Clause as well.
III.

THE PROBLEMS OF PURPOSE

The First Amendment is more than a drafting exercise. No
Justice believes that the state constitutionally can use generally
applicable regulations of conduct for the purpose of suppressing
religion. That is why the Court has insisted that laws must be
COIJtent-neutral as well as generally applicable to avoid heightened scrutinyY 8 The same reasoning should also be true with
respect to regulations of expression. But the nature of the inq~iry, according to Justice Scalia, is "whether the purpose of the
law is to suppress communication." 119
Any attempt to base a constitutional test on a determination
of the purpose of a legislative act will fail to sufficiently protect
117. In this scenario, the five votes in support of Smith- Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas - would be crucial. Justice Scalia is committed to
abandoning O'Brien. Justice Thomas generally has indicated a judicial philosophy in
line with Justice Scalia although he has not passed on this specific question in a free
speech case. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Cowles and is the author of the
suggestion in Turner that indicates the potential change in First Amendment doctrine.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined in
the Cowles opinion. Although Justice Stevens dissented in Barnes, applying the
O'Brien test, the dissent in which he joined focused on the lack of generality of the law
and its purpose to suppress expression - in other words, it was not in his view a content-neutral law. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 587. The ambiguity ("may or may not be subject to
heightened scrutiny") in Justice Kennedy's comment on neutral generally applicable
laws in Turner may have reflected his need to keep Justices Blackmun and Souter with
him in that case. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. That he left the sentence in the opinion
suggests controversy within the Court.
118. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
119. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the interests of the First Amendment. Justice Scalia's insistence
on an objective test that ignores subjective legislative motivation
is inadequate to determine whether the legislation has a forbidden objective. Even the more expansive equal protection inquiry proposed by Justice Kennedy in Lukumi ultimately will
allow speech suppression that should be barred. The Court
should continue to use prophylactic tests that invalidate some
laws with a proper objective in order to reduce the possibility
that laws with an improper purpose will survive.
A.

Legislative Purpose v. Legislative Motivation

Justice Scalia has criticized the Court's use of a standard
that requires a determination of legislative purpose, at least
when "legislative purpose" means the "actual motives of those
responsible for the challenged action" as in the context of the
"secular purpose" portion of the Lemon test for establishment bf·
religion.
For while it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a
statute (i.e. the public good at which its provisions appear to be
directed), or even the formal motivation for a statute where that
is explicitly set forth ... , discerning the subjective motivation of
those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. 120

On this basis, Justice Scalia argued that the subjective intent of
government decisionmakers should be sought only if the Constitutional provision commands the Court to do so. 121 Thus, in
Barnes when he called for an investigation into purpose, "the
threshold inquiry of whether the purpose of the law is to suppress communication," 122 he was referring to the "objective purpose," "the public good at which its provisions appear to be
120. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. /d. at 639.
122. 501 U.S. 560, 578 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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directed. " 123 This concept was based on the provisions of the
statute and some common sense about the world in which the
statute operates, not an inquiry into the "subjective motivation
of those enacting the statute." 124
Justice Scalia uses different methods of interpretation for
statute and Constitution - eschewing legislative history in statutory interpretation and seeking it out for the interpretation of
clauses of the Constitution.l25 His criticism of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation has been widely noted. 126
However, here the aim of the inquiry into purpose is not to interpret the language to determine its applicatipn but to determine whether a facially neutral statute has an unneutral end.
That is a very different issue.
Any discussion of the purpose of a law runs into the quandary that statutes are the products of multimember bodies whose
members may have both different motives (why they want the
statute enacted) and different goals (how they want the statute
to apply) for the same vote. Justice Scalia escapes the quagmire
by refusing to look at the legislators and focusing on the legislation. As an interpretive methodology, the "objective" approach
has several virtues: It avoids the difficulties of determining motivation, it sets forth an intelligible standard for Congress to follow in accomplishing its purposes, and it pressures Congress to
accomplish its aims through the statutory language rather than
by means of insertions of speeches into the record. The cost of
errors in statutory interpretation is checked because Congress
can revise the law if it dislikes the decision.
123. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636.
124. /d. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. See generally Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L. J. 160.
126. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990).
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When the Court upholds a law that restrains a person from
expression, especially the expression of unpopular views, the legislature is under no pressure to revise it. The essential question
is whether facially neutral criteria are being used as a proxy for
the suspect criteria of speech or religious exercise. Ignoring evidence of illicit motivation simplifies the case, but it increases the
possibility of upholding speech suppression that was not incidental at all.
Justice Scalia purported to admire O'Brien for eschewing an
inquiry into illicit motivation, but that decision avoided the inquiry by substituting a balancing test that evaluated the importance of the government interest and available alternatives to
accomplish it. In Barnes, Justice Scalia specifically repudiated
the O'Brien test: "I think we should avoid wherever possible,
moreover, a method of analysis that requires judicial assessment
of the 'importance' of government interests.m 27
Finding the "object" of legislation through careful analysis
of the text and context of the law may yield clear and determinate results as it did in Lukumi. However, the resulting unanimity in that case should not obscure the difficulty of the task. If a
statute restricts religion or expression, the effect is plain. If it
does so while purporting to be neutral, it is possible to examine
whether any other conduct is in fact affected. If the statute affects additional unprotected conduct, the additional scope of the
statute raises questions regarding its "object." The weakness of
the state's interest in regulating the additional conduct may suggest that it is no more than protective coloration for a statute,
the object of which is to suppress expression or religious exercise. Unless those interests are in some way weighed, the judge
may validate a law that was enacted solely to suppress expression. Furthermore, the judgment on the "object" of the law may
127. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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be a close one where a weak but legitimate basis for the law can
be identified. In those instances, it should be relevant that a substantial body of legislators avowedly acted to harm religion or
expression.
Justice Scalia's objective test would ignore statements made
during the course of legislative debate that a statute is aimed at
destroying a religion and the impact on others is simply an unfortunate cost of making the law generally applicable. Where
such statements are not in the text of the statute and no overbreadth or underinclusiveness can be shown, Justice Scalia's doctrine would lead him to uphold the statute despite the
insignificance of the governmental interest it purports to
vindicate.
If Justice Scalia refuses to assess the importance of the government interest in legislation and ignores legislative motives, he
is likely to uphold some generally applicable laws that exist
solely because they harm some disfavored speech or religion.
This methodology is an open invitation to the intolerant to use
generally applicable laws as a tool to suppress ideas. Such laws
are not the most convenient tools - rather like using a two-byfour instead of a hammer to pound nails - but they may do the
job.

B.

Equal Protection Analysis of the Neutrality of Generally
Applicable Laws

An inquiry into legislative intent has been the hallmark, not
of First Amendment jurisprudence, but of equal protection doctrine. A race-neutral law challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause on the grounds that it has the effect of disproportionately
disadvantaging a particular racial group will be struck down only
if the person attacking its validity can show that the law was ra-
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cially motivated. 128 Thus, Justice Kennedy wrote in Lukumi:
"[i]n determining whether the object of a law is a neutral one
under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our
equal protection cases. " 129 Justice Kennedy then examined the
transcripts of the city council meeting where the ordinance in
question was adopted as evidence that the object of the ordinance was to discriminate against the Santeria religion. 130 This
acceptance of evidence of subjective motivation in assessing the
neutrality of a statute is an advance over Justice Scalia's position.
It remains, however, a step short of the protection needed for
expression. The Court's decision to require a racial "intent" in
equal protection jurisprudence was the product of a variety of
considerations that do not apply to free speech. Furthermore,
the Court has departed from a rigid intent requirement within its
equal protection analysis.
The words "equal protection of the laws" invoke issues of
classification or comparison. They do not on their face indicate
which classifications are forbidden. 131 The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to pr9hibit racial discrimination. 132 Governmental entities that wished to engage in racial discrimination
learned to disguise their behavior by using non-racial language.
From the use of the grandfather clause in voting rights 133 to the
gerrymandered boundaries of Thskegee, 134 the Court recognized
and struck down the use of facially neutral classifications as
128. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
129. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
130. /d. at 540-41.
131. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982).
132. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); See generally H. Hv.
MAN AND W. WIECEK, EouAL JuSTICE UNDER LAw: CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1835-1875 (1982).
133. See, e.g., Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238

u.s. 347 (1915).
134. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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proxies for race. The early statutes were crude. The intentional
discrimination was identified easily, and the laws were struck
down. However, experience gave governmental actors greater
sophistication, and they have adopted more subtle measures.
Today it is infinitely more difficult to ferret out illegitimate motivation in statutes that use non-racial criteria that result in a disproportionate racial effect. When persons challenging a facially
neutral statute have the burden of proving it was racially motivated, they often will fail. The more difficult the requirements of
proof, the more likely that illegitimate motivation will escape judicial sanction.
The Court might have adopted a balancing test - weighing
the importance of the non-racial interest the criteria arguably
serves against the harm of the racially disproportionate impact
- to assure that race was not a factor in the classification. 135
The Court offered two reasons in Washington v. Davis136 for its
rejection of such an approach- precedent and the institutional
role of the court. 137 The Court also might have noted that a balancing test could injure some members of the group allegedly
discriminated against. These reasons, however, do not apply to
the use of balancing tests under the First Amendment for facially
content-neutral laws that have an impact on speech or religious
exercise.
1.

Reasons for the Purpose Test in Equal Protection

The Davis Court had little trouble identifying a series of
cases in jury selection, voting, and education that contained
statements that the racial impact of laws did not constitute a con135. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory
of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1987).
136. 426

u.s. 229 (1976).

137. /d. at 239-41.

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 240 1996-1997

1997]

GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

241

stitutional violation without a showing of a purpose to
discriminate. 138
One reason for the precedents is the fear that a balancing
test triggered by racial disproportionality would lead to judicial
intervention on the wisdom of most existing laws. 139 All laws
classify. In view of the racial differences in our society, most
classifications in laws have differential racial impacts. Residential segregation, however caused, means that geographical classifications have a racial impact. Because African-Americans are
represented disproportionately in the lower economic class, virtually all statutes with a financial aspect will have a disproportionate impact leaving every law open to challenge.
If an equal protection effects test applied only where a his-

torically disadvantaged group was burdened, the doctrine would
pressure all laws to favor that group. Even if the result were
just, it would be politically impossible to maintain a democratic
society with such a bias against the majority. If the effects test
applied regardless of which racial group was adversely affected,
then all laws would require judicial approval.
In short, an effects test strains the judicial capacity of the
Court because it would render almost every law prima facie invalid. If such a test required a justification above the present
rational basis standard, it would immerse the judiciary in second
guessing the legislature on the wisdom of virtually all of its measures. It is not surprising that the Court avoided such a result.
138. /d. at 239-40 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973);
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)).
139. "A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid,
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than
another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the
more affluent white." Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
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Another reason the Court has resisted the use of a balancing test for equal protection is its effect on members of the class
intended to be protected. Where race is not the classifying device, some members of the disfavored race are likely to receive
the law's benefits. For example, a capital gains tax reduction disproportionately favors whites, but wealthy blacks also would
have their taxes reduced. Thus, a doctrine requiring more than a
rational basis to sustain laws with disproportionate racial effects
would harm some members of the very class the Court sought to
protect. An equal protection balancing test is all or nothing the law will either be valid or invalid. The laws cannot be redrafted to focus on disfavored groups and then allow them to opt
out. The Court cannot eliminate the law's racial impact without
preventing the legislature from pursuing the interest that led it to
enact the law - e.g. it cannot invalidate the capital gains tax
deduction for whites because of its racially disproportionate effect but allow blacks to take it.
Thus, a combination of factors prevents the Court from
adopting an effects test for equal protection violations and leads
it to retain the "invidious purpose" inquiry. Balancing in equal
protection makes every law a federal case and the sole remedy
the drastic one of total invalidation. If racial effect is the only
interest that explains a classification, the law will be struck down
for its invidious purpose. However, if the law serves or might
serve a legitimate interest the balancing test threatens to prevent
the government from pursuing that interest even though it benefits some members of the group on whose behalf the Court
would act.
2.

Sub Rosa Balancing in Equal Protection

Although the balancing test for the First Amendment has
been contrasted with the search for invidious purpose in equal
protection cases, Justice O'Connor claimed in Smith that "appli-

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 242 1996-1997

1997]

GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

243

cation of our established free exercise doctrine to this case"
would not "necessarily be incompatible with our equal protection cases. "140
Daniel R. Ortiz has noted that the Court announces in
equal protection cases that its inquiry is into the intent of the
government body, but that its practice uses more objective factors.141 In particular, the Court requires less evidence to prove
intent in voting and jury selection cases than in housing and employment cases. 142
Some problems of balancing in equal protection cases are
reduced by limitations on that doctrine's scope. The greater the
injury to the structure of government from racial disparities, the
greater the incentive to lower the standard of proof necessary to
show that the disparity is the object of the classification. Acceptable proof determines the degree to which discriminating parties
escape detection and also the number of innocent parties disadvantaged. However, under any standard of proof for discriminatory purpose, some discriminating parties escape detection.
3. The Inappropriateness of Equal Protection Standards
in First Amendment Cases
The language of the Equal Protection Clause is language of
classification. Thus, the search for purpose as a mechanism to
determine the true basis for classification is tied to the language
of the Constitutional provision, and supported by numerous
precedents. Freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion
do not on their face appear limited to laws classifying on speech
or religious grounds. Lower scrutiny has few free speech prece140. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613, 618 (1982); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-95 (1977)).
141. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105
(1989).
142. Id. at 1107.
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dents to support its methodology, and the free exercise precedents for low scrutiny of generally applicable rules of conduct
had been ignored for three decades.
In Smith, Justice Scalia put forth a parade of horribles that
would result from a balancing test under the First Amendment,
arguing that almost every activity could be engaged in for expressive purposes and thus every law could become an object of
scrutiny. 143 However, the issue would not be the classifications
made by the law (and thus whether the law can be applied at all)
but the law's validity as applied to the activity when it is engaged
in for expressive purposes. In fact, few laws would be subject to
challenge as applied. Although a limitless number of actions
"could" be expressive, they rarely are. Furthermore, requiring
the state to show a compelling reason for the application of a
general law to expressive conduct or speech would not favor any
particular group or speech. Thus, applying a higher level of scrutiny to the incidental impairment of expression or religious exercise would not pose extraordinary difficulties for the Court.
Scrutinizing the application of the law in a specific instance
with a balancing test does not threaten the law's general validity.
The group benefited by the invalidation consists of those persons
who engage in expression, and that group is coextensive with the
reach of the decision that strikes down the law as applied. The
benefits of the law still are obtained with respect to all of its
other applications.
Since the main reasons for rejecting balancing under the
Equal Protection Clause for facially neutral laws do not apply to
balancing under the First Amendment, and the potential danger
of pretextual classifications is just as great, a balancing test
would be preferable to the direct inquiry into purpose as a

143. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89.
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means of assuring that neutral laws of general application do not
have the improper purpose of impairing free expression.
C.

Prophylactic Precedent

Although the suggestion that neutral, generally applicable
laws impairing speech should receive no heightened scrutiny appears to assume that the purpose of the law is crucial to its validity, the Court has never openly adopted a purpose-centered
vision of the First Amendment. Indeed, the Court has invalidated laws restricting speech or press while indicating that the
law's purpose was legitimate. 144 The nearest approach to a purpose-centered inquiry is Justice Scalia's argument that such an
inquiry is supported by the Court's holdings with respect to laws
that do not directly or indirectly impede speech. 145 But Justice
Scalia also has said that a law restricting speech must meet a high
standard of justification even if the purpose of the restriction has
nothing to do with the suppression of communication. 146 Thus,
precedent seems to discourage any attempt to assert a purposecentered standard for determining abridgments of freedom of
speech or of the press.
On the other hand, the free speech decisions of the
Supreme Court are consistent with a purpose-centered view of
the First Amen,dment. 147 The "high standard" often simply
guards against use of the law to suppress communication. For
example, in Saia v. New York, 148 the Court said that the lack of
standards for a loudspeaker permit posed too great a danger that
144. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down ban on leafletting despite anti-littering justification).
145. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., concurring).
146. !d. at 576.
147. See generally DAVID S. BoGEN, BuLWARK OF LIBERTY (1984); Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996).
148. 334 u.s. 558 (1948).
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the authorities would base their discretion on the content of the
speech. 149 A law prohibiting leafletting on public streets might
be enacted because leafletting in public places is a major vehicle
of communication for government critics outside the mainstream. Most, if not all, of the Court's precedents can be characterized as standards to insure the forbidden purpose is not
involved in laws impairing speech. But .such a prophylactic approach to purpose is more speech protective than the limited inquiry into the object of the law ..that Justice Scalia urges for free
exercise and expressive conduct cases.
In free speech cases, the Court uses objective tests that put
the burden on the government to demonstrate that its actions
had a legitimate basis and that it could not satisfy those legitimate interests as well by other means that impose a lesser burden on speech. If the law affects speech and the state justifies
the law with an unimportant or insubstantial interest, then there
is a strong possibility that the speech-impairing effect is the real
reason for the law. If the interest is significant, but it could be
satisfied as well by other means that have less impact on expression, then the choice of the means or the scope of the statute
may have been influenced by illegitimate concerns. Thus, the
various tests used by the -Court in free speech cases involving
"content-neutral" laws can be derived from the principle that
suppression of free expression is not a legitimate purpose of
government.
The religion cases also may be reconciled with a purposecentered inquiry. 150 Indeed, Justice Scalia attempted to do so.
149. /d. at 562.
150. The history of the Free Exercise Clause may be read in a narrow framework.
The framers were concerned that individuals be free to reject the majority religion.
They understood that religious belief and prevailing religious worship caused no harm
except to the sensibility of those who had different views, and that the accident of different views should not result in punishment. However, there is little evidence that the
authors of the Constitution considered behavior protected when it affected others. See
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His distinction ·Of Sherbert and Yoder, however, as outside this
standard made his enterprise questionable. Both the Sherbert
and Yoder lines may be reconciled with the basic notion of forbidden purpose by using the analysis just applied to the free
speech cases. In unemployment compensation cases, the statute
withholds benefits if the claimant refuses available work, but excuses the claimant when there. are compelling personal reasons,
such as dangers to health, for refusing the job. A determination
that refusal to work for religious reasons is not an acceptable
reason for unemployment could be a product of hostility to such
religious beliefs. Given the trivial impact on the fund from all
such claims, the state's interest in protecting the fund from such
claims seems insignificant, and the possibility that an illegitimate
concern influenced the denial of benefits is too great. The Yoder
balancing may also be explained as an attempt to be sure that
the scope of the mandatory school law did not include overriding
religious beliefs because of antipathy to those beliefs.

William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 376-79 (1989-90). There is instead substantial
support for the proposition that the framers understood that religious belief was not
grounds to exempt an individual from a generally applicable statute. Ellis West, The
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
Pus. PoL'Y 591, 623-33 (1990).
In the end, however, history can be pressed into service for other positions. If the
framers did not anticipate exempting religious worship from generally applicable laws,
they may have focused only on laws serving important or substantial government interests. They were concerned with protecting religious worship, and Madison, for example, supported exemptions for conscientious objection to military service. 1 ANNALS oF
CoNG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). By stressing their concern for both speech and
religion and noting the changes within our society that have resulted in pervasive government regulation, a plausible argument may be made that the purposes the First
Amendment was designed to serve require protection even from generally applicable
regulations of conduct.
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THE LIMITS OF THE CoMPELLING INTEREST STANDARD

Thus far, this article has argued that the Court should have
a similar standard for generally applicable laws under both the
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment,
and that an exemption from heightened scrutiny for those laws
that are "neutral" will under-protect both religion and speech
even if the constitutional guarantees are understood to be directed to the purpose of the law. Prophylactic standat:ds are
more appropriate to preclude the possibility of illegitimate purpose. On the other hand, it is unrealistic and unwise for the
Court to use its most stringent test to review the incidental restrictions on speech and religion imposed by neutral, generally
applicable laws.
A "compelling interest" standard would. afford the greatest
protection to speech and religion, but the standard is not workable. It cannot apply to all neutral, generally applicable laws, it is
difficult to distinguish any subset of such laws to which it might
be applied, and its application there would dilute its effectiveness where it currently applies.
The Court cannot practically require the highest standard to
justify minimal impacts on speech or religion. Because government's interest in particular laws can rarely be characterized as
anything more than substantial, a compelling interest test would
exempt individuals from most laws which negatively affect their
speech or religion. Privileging religion or speech from the most
trivial impairment would be intolerable. Even the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act requires a substantial impairment to
trigger the compelling interest test. 151 Thus, the compelling interest standard is unsuitable for evaluating all incidental restrictions on speech.
151. 42

u.s.c. § 2000bb-1

(1994).

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 248 1996-1997

1997]

GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

249

The Court will have difficulty identifying an appropriate
subset of neutral, generally applicable laws for heightened scrutiny. The Court has not yet adequately defined such a class despite the suggestions of scholars. 152 Professor Michael C. Dorf
has argued that heightened scrutiny for generally applicable laws
should depend on the substantiality of the impairment of
rights. 153 Substantiality, however, is a matter of degree. As an
on-off switch for heightened scrutiny, it is arbitrary. It is both
underprotective and overprotective unless the "substantiality" of
the impairment is contextual - i.e. varies with the strength of
the state's interest and the availability of non-restrictive alternatives that would satisfy that interest. If those factors are considered, the scrutiny takes place before the "determination" of the
level of scrutiny. The real test would be balancing, and it would
apply to all laws impacting speech or religion.
Further, even if the Court could distinguish among neutral,
generally applicable laws, a compelling interest is not the appropriate heightened scrutiny. The Court can manipulate almost
any test in application. As a result, the use of a compelling interest test with respect to laws incidentally impacting speech or religion would undermine its strength in evaluating racially
discriminatory laws and those that directly impair speech or
religion.·
The stringency of a compelling interest test depends on the
values of the judges who implement it. The Court is unlikely to
preclude government from vindicating legitimate interests by
laws with only an incidental impact on religion, regardless of the
152. Srinivasan suggested a test based on the likelihood of speech-suppressive administrative motivation. However, rather than urging a compelling interest test, he distinguished cases subject to O'Brien and those receiving no review. Srinivasan, supra
note 107.
153. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
1175, 1210 (1996).

REV.
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test articulated. The Court may find that the government's interest in avoiding administrative problems or difficulties in distinguishing among groups that might seek exemptions is
compelling. Thus, the Court upheld the application to the
Amish of the social security laws in United States v. Lee, 154 and
Justice O'Connor found the compelling interest test satisfied in
Smith. 155 Nevertheless, the articulated standard constrains the
Court to some degree.
The standard for evaluating neutral, generally applicable
laws under the First Amendment should not be as high as the
standard for justification of racially discriminatory laws. First,
the neutrality and general applicability of a law provide substantial warrant that any impact on speech is incidental. 156 A neu154. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). Few laws, looked at individually, can show a compelling interest for their application to expression or religious exercise. On the other hand,
the total impact on society from a religious and expressive exemption for most laws
could be quite significant. For example, one cost of exemption is the necessity to make
a determination whether the particular individual is acting with a religious or expressive
purpose. The social cost of time and energy to make this determination under one law
may not be significant, but if cumulated for all laws, it could have a large impact. The
"compelling interest" in the specific case, then, may be the absence of sufficient
grounds to distinguish this requested exemption from exemptions to other laws that
cumulatively would have a substantial impact on the operations of government.
155. 494 U.S. 872, 904-05 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. There is a good argument for the compelling interest test if there is evidence
that a law of general application was targeted at speech or religion. That would be
analogous to mixed motive cases like Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977),
where the Court requires the government to prove that it would have acted the same
way in the absence of the impermissible motive. /d. at 287. But Mount Healthy's standard applies to administrative decisions against individuals, where invalidating the discharge has a limited impact on the general power of government to address public
needs.
A compelling interest standard for mixed motive statutes could disable government from advancing important or substantial legitimate interests. The problems of
motive attribution differ from those in administrative decisions. If one legislator's statement of improper reasons triggers a compelling interest requirement, the entire body
politic is punished for the sins of one member. If the law is struck down for an illegitimate purpose, legislators might voice only good motives for its reenactment. Unless the

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 250 1996-1997

1997]

GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

251

tral, generally applicable law may affect an individual's speech,
expression or religious exercise, but it is unlikely to have a significant effect on speech or religion in general. As long as the
Court prevents laws from being targeted at speech or religion,
people who wish to express particular religious convictions or
ideas need not curb their activities for fear that the government
will persecute them.
Second, the conduct regulated by most generally applicable
laws poses the same probl~m for society, whether or not it is
engaged in for religious or expressive reasons. Thus, the justification for applying the law to the protected activity is the same
as the justification for the statute itself. Assuming that the law
would be valid with respect to these other applications, a religious or expression exemption would disable government from
acting to protect its legitimate interests. A "compelling interest"
standard could expand significantly the scope of situations where
government is powerless to vindicate the legitimate concerns of
its constituents.
In theory, a compelling interest requirement could adjust
the interest to the constitutional guarantee. If a "compelling interest" means an interest sufficient to compel a rational judge to
believe that a legislator acted appropriately in making a classification, it would have a very different bite for equal protection
and the First Amendment. Given the harm done historically by
state's interest is compelling, however, the Court will suspect the impermissible purpose
continues to affect the law. But refusal to uphold the reenactment deprives the legislature of the power to enact an appropriate law.
O'Brien may still be an appropriate standard because. it strikes a balance between
the ability of government to act for legitimate purposes and the protection of speech.
Where the balance is struck depends on the Court's view of the requirement that the
state's interest be "important or substantial" and that the impact on speech be no
greater than essential to further that interest. Evidence that the law was targeted at
speech or religion goes to the significance of the burden and should reduce the deference paid to legislative judgments of importance and necessity.
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racial discrimination, a legislator cannot appropriately create a
racial classification that discriminates against a historically disfavored minority unless there is no rational choice but to do so.
That is a very tough standard to meet, but a lesser one would
raise the specter of segregation's return.
On the other hand, a non-trivial government interest may
be sufficient to compel a judge to believe that a legislator acted
appropriately in enacting a law that vindicated that interest
against constitutionally protected as well as unprotected activity.
Previous uses of "compelling interest" have reflected the differential impact of the test in different settings. In both Smith and
Barnes, Justice Scalia's analysis of the caselaw found that the
Court always upheld neutral, generally applicable laws under a
First Amendment test that purported to afford them higher scrutiny.157 If in Smith or Cowles or any of the cases analyzed by
Justice Scalia, the state were required to show an interest as
compelling as that required to justify a racially discriminatory
law, few of those laws would have survived the challenge.
The problem with using this compelling interest test for all
constitutional guarantees is its instability. Perhaps it is possible
to live with a "compelling interest" standard in which an interest
is compelling for purposes of one constitutional guarantee and
not another, but it would be extremely difficult to do so.
Although the Court's past practice demonstrated contextual variation, it never admitted that it was using "compelling" in this
way. There were several reasons for its failure to say who was
157. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., concurring). "We have never invalidated
the application of a general law simply because the conduct that it reached was being
engaged in for expressive purposes and the government could not demonstrate a sufficiently important state interest." ld. at 577. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85. "We
have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except
the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to
apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied." ld. at 883.
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"compelled" to do what. First, an express articulation that the
standard measures whether the Court is compelled to believe
that the enactment was for a legitimate purpose could easily collapse into a direct purpose inquiry, which would prove to be an
unsatisfactory protection for speech and would substantially undermine protections against racial discrimination as well. Second, different outcomes suggest one right is more protected than
another - i.e. equality is more important than freedom of
speech - although there is no underlying theoretical basis for
the preference. Finally, this would likely lead to pressure to
eliminate the differential impact, which would either diminish
the strength of the guarantee for Fourteenth Amendment purposes or raise the standard for the First Amendment.
If the compelling interest test will not necessarily be speech

protective, and its use for generally applicable laws carries a substantial risk of devaluing the test for use in situations that
threaten core constitutional concerns, it would be better to look
· to an alternative standard for dealing with the issues posed by
generally applicable laws.
V.

A BALANCED TEsT FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PuRPOSES

The obvious candidate for a test to evaluate neutral, generally applicable laws is O'Brien. The O'Brien test sustains a content-neutral regulation if "it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. " 158 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Turner referred to O'Brien's test as the "intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral
158. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech. " 159
O'Brien provides the appropriate standard to review generally
applicable laws, since they are characterized by the likelihood
that any burden they impose on speech is incidental. The standard applies equally well to protect the free exercise of
religion. 160
The O'Brien test is designed to permit government to enact
laws for legitimate purposes while guarding against restrictions
directed at speech. "Intermediate" tests, like O'Brien, are open
to attack from both sides - for being either too strict or too
weak. Its operation depends on the values of the judges, which
makes it vulnerable to attack as unprincipled ad hoc decisionmaking. But moderation may be a virtue when core values are
protected and principle~ clash. Balancing reflects the values at
stake and is appropriate where confined in scope and done with
an understanding of its use. The O'Brien formulation allows balancing, but the Court should consider the factors to be balanced
more openly, recognizing the function of the test as a prophylactic means to assure that there is no impermissible purpose.
Although the O'Brien standard is an imperfect mechanism
to detect an impermissible purpose, it is the best alternative.
Both the "important or substantial interest" and the "no greater
than is essential" portions of the test may invalidate laws that did
not have suppression of speech as a purpose. The imperfect fit
of O'Brien could tempt the Court to examine the purpose of the
statute more directly. However, that would be a mistake. It
159. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
160. See Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4
CoNsT. CoMMENTARY 147, 152 (1987) (arguing that the Court should adopt O'Brien's
methodology for free exercise claims). See also Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 V AND. L. REv.
1335, 1343 n.31 (1995) (arguing that the "free speech methodology typified by O'Brien
and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), should be
incorporated into the Court's free exercise of religion jurisprudence.").
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would fail to eliminate the possibility that antipathy for that expression or religion produced the lack of an exemption to the
generally applicable law. The difficulty of proving a covert purpose enables too many laws to pass a test based on the statute's
objective. O'Brien permits the government to accomplish any
significant legitimate objective by redrafting the law, but the
O'Brien test decreases the likelihood that a law with an impermissible purpose will survive constitutional scrutiny.
A number of critics argue that the O'Brien standard is excessively deferential to the government. 161 It does not require
that the regulation be the least restrictive means of achieving the
state interest, only that no less restrictive alternative is capable
of serving the state's interest as efficiently. 162 Commentators
complain that O'Brien does not balance the marginal benefits of
the challenged restriction relative to alternative means. 163 That
critique is not necessarily true. Like the "compelling interest"
test, the substance of the O'Brien test depends heavily on how
judges apply it.
By remanding or reversing decisions that upheld challenged
laws, the Court recently invigorated the requirement that the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms be "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance" of an important or
substantial government interest. 164 The laws in question were
161. Dorf, supra note 153, at 1208; Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech
Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 641-44 (1987); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1483-86 (1975).
162. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,797-99 (1989); Ely, supra note 161,
at 1484-85.
163. Dorf, supra note 153, at 1208.
164. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (reversing ban on
liquor price advertising because more extensive than necessary to serve the state's interest); See also Turner, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (remanding under O'Brien, the FCC "must
carry" rules that required cable operators to carry broadcast stations on cable
channels).
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not generally applicable, but regulations of commercial speech
and cable television. These laws presented a higher risk for suppression of speech than most neutral, generally applicable laws,
and the Court appropriately raised the barriers.
Rhode Island's ban on advertising liquor prices was struck
down last term in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island. 165 The
Court's First Amendment test for commercial speech required in
part that any impact on free speech be '.'not more extensive than
is necessary to serve" a substantial state interest. 166 In Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 167 the Court stated that this prong of its commercial speech test was no more rigid than that of O'Brien. 168 In 44
Liquormart, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion for four Justices cited Fox for the standard that the law must be narrowly
tailored and held that Rhode Island's statute was unconstitutional in view of available altematives. 169 Although some of the
alternatives may have served the state's interest in moderation
as efficiently as the price advertising ban, they each had drawbacks.170 Thus, the Court applied scrutiny with some bite.
In Turner, cable operators appealed a summary judgment
which upheld a federal law that required them to carry broadcast
stations on cable channels. The Supreme Court agreed with the
court below that the requirement was content-neutral, and that
O'Brien was the proper level of scrutiny for content-neutral inci165. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
166. /d. at 1506 n.9 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
167. 492 u.s. 469 (1989).
168. /d. at 478.
169. 116 S. Ct. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter
and Breyer, JJ.) (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
170. Setting minimum prices for alcohol or raising taxes on it would shift purchases
to stores in neighboring states. A per capita limit on alcohol purchases would have a
similar effect and could be difficult to administer effectively. The effectiveness of an
educational campaign on the dangers of alcohol consumption may be questioned and it
costs money in a period when state budgets are tight.
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dental restrictions on speech. 171 Nevertheless, the Court reversed the summary jtidgment. 172 It remanded the case for more
evidence on all aspects of the factors relevant under O'Brienthe need for the legislation, the extent of the impairment on
speech interests, and the available altematives. 173
The remand in Turner and the concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart demonstrate that the Court can examine laws closely
under O'Brien. The closeness of that examination should tum
on the law's potential as a vehicle for the suppression of ideas.
A Court applying O'Brien's tests may consider the impact of the
law. The more substantial the burden on speech or religion, the
lower the deference to legislative judgments of importance or
necessity. This enables the doctrine to serve as a prophylactic
test that protects against impermissible purpose while enabling
the government to satisfy the legitimate interests of its citizens.
Abstract analysis of the importance of the governmental interest is insufficient, regardless of whether the court applies a
standard of "compelling interest" or simply "substantial or important" interest. It is always possible to inflate by abstraction
the interest on either side of a statute - the burning of a draft
card becomes the interest in the national defense or the societal
interest in freedom of speech. The Court should engage in the
more particularized inquiry of whether the application of the
rule to this religious or expressive activity is necessary to further
the social interest. The importance of the government interest
can best be evaluated in that incremental inquiry. In the "as applied" challenge, the question is not "why did you pass the law?"
but "why is it being applied to this expression or religious exercise?" Since the government may have the power to exempt
171. Turner, 114 S. Ct. 2445 at 2469 (1994).
172. /d. at 2472.
173. /d. at 2469, 2471-72.
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"constitutionally protected" activities from the scope of the law,
it should justify its failure to do so.
In sum, the O'Brien inquiry directs the attention of the
Court to more appropriate measures of the validity of the law
under the First Amendment. It protects against improper purpose by demanding a government interest unrelated to suppression of free expression, and gives the Court a tool to make it
effective by demanding the interest be important or substantial
and that the impact on speech (or religion) be no greater than is
essential to further that interest. If we are to have the same standards for generally applicable laws in both free exercise and free
speech cases, those standards should have some First Amendment bite.
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